Disarming fears of diversity: ethnic heterogeneity and state militarization, 1988-2002 by De Soysa, Indra & Neumayer, Eric
  
Indra De Soysa and Eric Neumayer 
Disarming fears of diversity: ethnic 
heterogeneity and state militarization, 1988-
2002 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
Original citation: 
De Soysa, Indra and Neumayer, Eric (2008) Disarming fears of diversity: ethnic heterogeneity 
and state militarization, 1988-2002. Journal of peace research, 45 (4). pp. 497-518. ISSN 1460-
3578  
 
DOI: 10.1177/0022343308091358  
 
© 2008 SAGE Publications 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/6199/  
Available in LSE Research Online: August 2012 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final manuscript accepted version of the journal article, 
incorporating any revisions agreed during the peer review process.  Some differences between 
this version and the published version may remain.  You are advised to consult the publisher’s 
version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=691305
Disarming Fears of Diversity: 
Ethnic Heterogeneity and State Militarization, 1988–2002∗ 
 
 
Published in: 
Journal of Peace Research, 45 (4), 2008, pp. 497-518 
 
 
 
 
Word Count = 9886 
 
 
 
INDRA DE SOYSA 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) 
Dept. of Sociology and Political Science 
7491, Trondheim, Norway 
 
+47-73551141 (ph), +47-73591564 (fax), indra.de.soysa@svt.ntnu.no 
and 
Centre for the Study of Civil War 
International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) 
 
 
ERIC NEUMAYER 
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) 
Department of Geography and Environment 
Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK 
+44-2079557598 (ph), +44-2079557412 (fax), e.neumayer@lse.ac.uk 
and 
Centre for the Study of Civil War, PRIO 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
∗
 Equal authorship. Corresponding author: Indra de Soysa. We would like to thank Norman Loayza, Jim Fearon, 
Nils Petter Gleditsch, Halvard Buhaug, Dawood Mamoon, the editors and anonymous referees for many helpful 
comments. All errors are our fault. Eric Neumayer acknowledges financial assistance from the Leverhulme Trust.  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=691305
 
1 
Disarming Fears of Diversity: 
Ethnic Heterogeneity and State Militarization, 1988–2002 
 
We examine whether ethnic and other diversity affects militarization of society. Recent 
scholarship in economics finds that high diversity leads to lower provision of public goods. 
At the same time, many conflict studies find that highly diverse societies face a lower risk of 
civil war. We explore whether diversity prompts governments to militarize heavily in order to 
prevent armed conflict, which would then crowd out spending on other public goods in a 
‘guns versus butter’ trade off. Yet we find the opposite: higher levels of ethnic diversity 
predict lower levels of militarization. If high diversity lowers the hazard of civil war, as many 
find, then it does not happen via preventive militarization. If diverse societies spend less on 
public goods, then this is not because they are crowded out by security concerns. Our results 
support those who suggest that diversity may in fact pose a lower security threat to states. 
 2 
There are two important strands of theoretical and empirical scholarship on the effects of 
ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity on state behavior. First, scholars interested in 
governance and public spending find that heterogeneity leads to lower provision of public 
goods, such as education, health, and infrastructure. Since diversity apparently poses 
problems for arriving at a consensus for co-operative solutions (a question of governance 
under diverse preferences), the greater the diversity the worse the policy outcomes (Alesina et 
al. 1999; Alesina et al. 2003; Easterly 2001). Secondly, cultural heterogeneity takes a 
prominent place in debates over the causes of violent conflict (Cederman and Girardin 2007; 
Fearon et al. 2007; Fox 2004; Gilley 2004; Gurr 1993; Horowitz 1998; Reynal-Querol 2002; 
Varshney 2001).1 The focus on religion in particular intensified following the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks in the US, although the tradition of explaining violent conflict in developing countries 
in the years after World War II as ethno-nationalist rebellion has deep roots (Drake 1957; 
Gurr 1970; Huntington 1968). The popular wisdom is that ethnic and, if less so, religious 
conflict is ‘endemic’ and ‘everywhere on the rise’.2 The vast majority of empirical evidence 
suggests, however, that ethnic and religious fractionalization does not predict a higher risk of 
civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Mueller 2000). If anything, high diversity makes countries 
safer (Wimmer and Min 2006), or in other words, ethnic dominance (Collier and Hoeffler 
2004a) or ethnic polarization (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005) is what matters for the 
hazard of civil war, not ethnic fractionalization. Nonetheless, theories built around such 
                                                 
1
 It is reported that one English-language scholarly journal database records 249 articles published since 1990 
containing ‘ethnic conflict’ in the title as opposed to just 23 with ‘class conflict’ (Gilley 2004: 1155). Some argue 
that ‘ethnic conflict’ is a myth and that the role of ethnicity in conflict is highly exaggerated, leading to flawed 
policy prescriptions with dangerous consequences (Gagnon 2004). 
2
 See Kaplan (1994) for a recent explication of the primordialist argument that suggests ethnic and, more broadly, 
cultural conflict to be endemic. Huntington’s (1993, 1996) hypothesis of a Clash of Civilizations provides a related 
argument. Others report that the incidence of ethnic conflict and inter-communal violence is declining (Gurr 2000). 
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concepts as ethnic hatred and ethnic security dilemmas are prominent in the literature 
(Kaufmann 1996; Petersen 2001; Posen 1993; Snyder and Jervis 1999; Walter and Snyder 
1999). Ethnic and religious conflict occurs because groups are unable to coordinate mutual 
security fears (Woodward 1995), manage underlying social frictions, and accommodate 
nationalist demands (Cederman and Girardin 2005; Wimmer 1997; Wolff 2006).3 Clearly, the 
issue of ethnic diversity’s effect on state behaviour is not just interesting for theory building. 
Much international and local policy is currently focused on achieving viable peace and 
development strategies in heterogeneous populations, most notably in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
where issues of cultural representation dominate political discourse. 
We explore whether there is a link between the two strands of literature. Specifically, 
ethnic diversity could lead to security concerns to which governments respond with higher 
‘preventive militarization’. Since high fractionalization might pose a readily-observable 
security threat, perhaps governments over-compensate the security risks, neglecting other 
public goods? This may account for why some countries have high diversity and no conflict, 
while simultaneously having lower public goods. In other words, does ethnic diversity lead to 
higher militarization, thus crowding out the provision of non-security public goods in a 
special kind of guns-versus-butter trade-off? We test this issue empirically, employing 
several measures of ethnic and cultural diversity and polarization on three indicators of state 
militarization, namely military expenditures, the share of military personnel in the labor 
force, and arms imports. Additionally, we employ a measure of ethnic exclusion, currently 
only available for a limited group of countries (Cederman and Girardin 2007). 
                                                 
3
 Some find a monotonic positive effect between ethnic diversity and conflict in some estimations (Ellingsen 2000; 
Sambanis 2001, 2004). We are in no position to evaluate the reasons for the discrepant findings, but note that the 
vast majority of evidence points in the direction that ethnic diversity lowers the hazard of civil war. The debate 
between those who see ethnicity as crucial for understanding conflict and those who see it as epiphenomenal 
further justifies why one needs to test the effect of ethnic diversity on militarization. 
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Our results are easily summarized. We find that heterogeneity predicts lower, rather 
than higher, levels of military spending to GDP between 1988 and 2002, controlling for 
several salient factors, such as country size, income, regime type, security risks, armed 
conflict etc. If states fear ethnic diversity, or if heterogeneity drives dangerous social 
frictions, it does not show in terms of how states prepare to deal with this. The results are 
robust to sample size and several different specifications and testing procedures. Ethnic 
heterogeneity is also negatively related to the share of military personnel in the total labor 
force. Since most poor countries are likely to follow more labor-intensive security strategies, 
this result too is instructive. Ethnic diversity also reduces the share of arms imports in total 
imports. Religious heterogeneity has no statistically significant effect in any of the tests, 
which confirms existing studies that fail to find an effect of religious heterogeneity on either 
growth or institutional quality. In one set of estimations, it seems to be linguistic rather than 
ethnic heterogeneity that diminishes militarization, but Alesina et al.’s (2003) measure of 
linguistic fractionalization is highly correlated with ethnic fractionalization. In the case of 
militarization, we find that it is heterogeneity that matters, and not polarization, as some have 
argued (e.g., Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). 
The results taken together do not suggest that governments ‘run scared’ because of 
ethnic and other diversity – quite the opposite. They throw into doubt the notion that minority 
ethnic groups in ethnically diverse societies need to fear high state militarization when they 
rebel for autonomy. Neither do the results support a conjecture that heterogeneous societies 
remain peaceful because states militarize to prevent violent conflict. Realist theories in 
particular argue that ethnic conflict in Eastern and Central Europe was kept in check by 
Soviet military might, only to erupt with the withdrawal of Soviet power (Huntington 1993; 
Mearsheimer 1990). If in fact diversity is a source of potential violent conflict, it does not 
seem likely that peace prevails because of a ‘garrison state’ effect. We find exactly the 
opposite of this expectation regarding state behavior under conditions of ethnic and other 
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diversity. Our results therefore do not suggest that militarization crowds out public goods 
under conditions of diversity either. Similar to the problems diverse societies encounter for 
the provision of public goods, it seems that they may have difficulties collecting the taxes, 
forging political support, or reaching the social consensus required for militarization. This 
does not mean we would advocate militarization as a solution, but rather that governments do 
not seem to act the way we think would be a rational response to real and/or perceived threats 
emanating from ethnic diversity. 
 
Ethnic Diversity, Public Goods, and Armed Conflict 
Ethnic and other forms of diversity are not only interesting because of their supposed links to 
violent conflict. Research suggests that it adversely affects economic development and public 
policy outcomes as well. Ethnic heterogeneity (and polarization) is seen as the underlying 
cause of the failure of collective action, particularly as it generates incentives for rent-seeking 
(Alesina 1994; Alesina and Drazen 1991; Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Garcia-Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol 2005; Posner 2004). Political economy models suggest that heterogeneity is 
“prone to competitive rent-seeking by the different groups that have difficulty agreeing on 
public goods like infrastructure, education, and good policies” (Easterly and Levine 1997: 2). 
This phenomenon has been demonstrated at various levels of aggregation – see, for example, 
Alesina, Baqir and Easterly’s (1999) study of the negative impact of ethnic fractionalization 
on public good spending in U.S. cities and Easterly and Levine’s (1997) cross-national study 
explaining Africa’s growth tragedy.4 Africa’s economic woes are seen as being directly 
related to the bad public policies as a result of ethnic heterogeneity, where political conflicts 
driven by ethnic frictions impede good governance and sound public goods provision 
(Easterly and Levine 1997; Kimenyi 1997). Cross-national studies show that ethnic 
                                                 
4
 Posner (2004) corrects Easterly and Levine’s (1997) measure for ethnic groups that are politically relevant and 
comes to the same conclusion. 
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polarization lowers investment, whereas religious polarization increases government 
consumption relative to GDP (Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). Alesina et al 
(2003), however, find that it is diversity that matters more than polarization on the question 
of poor economic policy and public goods provision, due largely to coordination failure 
arising from social frictions. Possibly, the negative effects of fractionalization are mitigated 
in democracies (Collier 2001) or rather, as Easterly (2001) argues, where institutional quality 
is high, which is only weakly correlated with democracy. However, some find that 
institutional quality is itself negatively affected by ethnic fractionalization (Alesina et al. 
2003; Keefer and Knack 2002; Ritzen and Woolcock 2000). 
Recent studies of civil war onset show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, ethnic 
diversity’s role in violent conflict is not straightforward. Ethnicity is important of course for 
organization and mobilization of support, but conflict occurs when the opportunity for using 
large-scale violence is maximized (Collier et al. 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004a). In highly 
homogeneous societies there is little ethnic strife, whereas a high degree of fractionalization 
prevents effective mobilization. Collier (2001) argues that highly fractionalized societies will 
pose difficulties for large enough minimum winning coalitions to form that can effectively 
challenge a state’s monopoly on force. Many empirical studies suggest that there is ‘more 
murder in the middle,’ with moderately fractionalized societies facing the greatest danger 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004a; de Soysa 2002; Reynal-Querol 2002). Others call this 
polarization, where two equally sized groups are the most dangerous, or in other words, 
where moderate fractionalization prevails, since measures of polarization are at a maximum 
when society is made up of two groups containing 50% of the population each (Alesina et al. 
2003; Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2002). Moreover, if the largest minority is large 
enough, it is a more attractive target for expropriation by a majority, leading to polarized 
conflict and violence (Caselli and Coleman 2006).  
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Yet, there is a mechanism other than Collier’s (2001) minimum winning coalition 
argument by which ethnically diverse societies might achieve civil peace. If states anticipate 
a high probability of violence or ethnic challenges under conditions of heterogeneity (social 
frictions), they might be prone to deter large-scale violence through preventive 
militarization.5 It is this aspect of the debate we test on militarization, only discussing the 
question of violent conflict as a backdrop for why militarization should matter. If diverse 
societies in fact engage in preventive militarization, then this could also provide one of the 
reasons why these societies under-provide public goods, thus providing a possible causal link 
between the two strands of literature regarding the effects of diversity on state behaviour. 
Our study is motivated by mainly two interrelated concerns. The first is theoretical 
from the perspective of conflict studies. If ethnic diversity is inherently dangerous, then do 
states prepare to meet it via militarization? If ethnic heterogeneity does not seem to matter in 
terms of the outbreak of civil war, is this because states suppress conflict effectively by 
increasing military capacity? Secondly, is the strong empirical association relating ethnic 
divisions to lower levels of public good provision related to higher militarization? Do states 
respond to the ethnic diversity ‘threat’ via militarization, thus crowding out other public 
goods? In fact, several scholars treat military spending as a public good both regionally and 
within countries because if it in fact buys security, then others benefit from having to spend 
less given the regional nature of the consequences (Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Olson 1982). 
Our analysis is designed to answer these questions. 
 
                                                 
5
 Collier and Hoeffler (2004c) do not find that higher military spending deters civil conflict, whilst Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004b) even show that higher spending might increase rather than reduce the risk of renewed conflict in 
post-conflict societies. Yet, many policy makers all over the world seem to think that militarization is needed for 
conflict prevention. 
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Research Design 
We employ a pooled time-series, cross-section (TSCS) data set. Our main dependent variable 
consists of military expenditures over GDP (Military expenditures). We keep this variable in 
its level form, but our main results are hardly affected if it is logged instead. Others also 
report this finding (Collier and Hoeffler 2004c). The data are taken from the World 
Development Indicators CD-Rom (World Bank 2004), which is also the source for the other 
variables unless noted otherwise. They are available annually from 1988 up to 2002, a total of 
15 years. Combining various sources one could in principle construct a panel that reaches 
further back in time. However, given measurement and international and inter-temporal 
comparability problems with military expenditure data, particularly during the period of the 
Cold War (Brzoska 1995), we prefer to use one single data source that largely covers only the 
post-Cold War period. The recent data are also much more reliable given improved standards 
for collecting data and higher levels of transparency due to democratization and international 
pressure (Omitoogun 2003). The World Bank data are almost identical to data supplied to us 
directly by SIPRI (r = 0.98).  
In addition, we use two other variables capturing aspects of militarization to build 
robustness. The second dependent variable is military personnel as a share of the total labor 
force (Military personnel). The advantage of using the share of military personnel is that poor 
countries may simply use labor-intensive (rather than capital-intensive) forms of 
militarization. Finally, we use arms imports relative to total imports (Arms imports). This 
variable is only available up to 1999, and in principle arms import expenditures should be 
included in total military expenditures. However, for some countries arms imports are not 
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accounted for in military expenditures (Brzoska 1995) and a high arms to total imports ratio 
provides yet another feature of militarization. These data are from (World Bank 2003).6 
Our primary independent variable is ethnic heterogeneity (Alesina et al. 2003; Fearon 
2003). This measure is defined as the probability that two randomly selected individuals from 
the same country belong to different ethnic or linguistic groups, computed as 
∑
=
−≡
n
i
ipELF
1
21 , where pi is the population share of ethnic or linguistic group i and n is the 
number of existing groups. These data are based on more current, updated sources, and do not 
conflate ethnic, religious and linguistic characteristics in a single measure as blatantly as the 
old ELF measure based on Soviet ethnographic studies during the 1960s (Fearon 2003). They 
also rely on survey-based studies that have examined several African countries, where 
distinction of groups is not always straightforward. Fearon (2003: 196) claims that his 
measure is ‘broadly similar’ to Alesina et al’s (2003) measure. Both these measures are 
highly similar to Montalvo and Reynal-Querol’s (2005). In addition to these three sources, 
Roeder (2001) has developed an ethnolinguistic fractionalization index, which is mainly 
based on the original Soviet sources from the 1960s together with other Soviet ethnographic 
studies from the 1980s. 
Additionally, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) argue that it is polarization rather 
than fractionalization that matters. Polarization measures “the normalized distance of a 
particular distribution of ethnic and religious groups from a bimodal distribution” (see 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005: 301 for details). It is computed as 
∑
=








−
−≡
n
i
i
i p
p
P
1 5.
5.
1 , where pi is again the population share of group i and n is the number 
                                                 
6
 There is one data point of more than 100 per cent (Ethiopia 1989), which can happen if there are inconsistencies 
in the reporting and measurement of arms as well as total imports. Dropping this observation from the sample had 
little impact on the results. 
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of existing groups. Polarization approaches unity when the population is made up of two 
equally sized groups and then declines as the number of groups increases further, whereas 
fractionalization increases monotonically with the number of groups. Empirically, across 
countries ethnic polarization is related to ethnic fractionalization in a non-linear way: Ethnic 
polarization first rises with increasing fractionalization, but then falls at an intermediate level 
of fractionalization. Religious polarization is somewhat different. It first increases as 
fractionalization increases and then at higher levels of fractionalization there is no 
relationship to polarization. See Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) for a detailed 
discussion. Table 1 provides a correlation matrix for the various measures of fractionalization 
and polarization used. There is clearly often strong correlation among the various measures, 
but they are far from identical. We use the conservative strategy of testing all these measures 
to ensure robustness of our results, a strategy advocated by both Fearon (2003) and Alesina et 
al. (2003). 
In a recent debate on the importance of ethnicity for predicting conflict, Cederman 
and Girardin (2007) argued that fractionalization measures are not a good way of capturing 
why ethnic grievances matter for conflict (see also Fearon et al. 2007). They propose that 
what matters is not ethnic diversity as such, but the exclusion of ethnic groups from state 
power. They construct a measure of ethnic exclusion based on the size of the ethnic groups 
that do not share in government, which they call N-star. The smaller the size of the ethnic 
group in power, the greater the chances of violence. We use their measure of N-star to test 
also this aspect of ethnicity on state militarization in sensitivity analysis. Do ethnic minorities 
in power use their access to state resources to insure their predominance through 
militarisation? 
There is an enormous theoretical and empirical literature that has accumulated on the 
causes and consequences of military spending (Gleditsch et al. 2000; Hartley and Hooper 
1990). Most of these studies have focused on arms races between the superpowers, or are 
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case studies of single countries over time. We rely primarily on two recent empirical studies 
addressing the determinants of military spending, namely Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004b) 
study of military expenditures in five-year averaged periods from 1960-1999 and 
Goldsmith’s (2003) study of military spending over the period 1886 to 1989, neither of which 
addresses ethnic and other diversity. 
We control for the level of per capita income in purchasing power parity (Gross 
National Income p.c.) as well as its growth rate (Economic growth per capita), which are 
commonly used variables (Davoodi et al. 2001; Goldsmith 2003; Gupta et al. 2001). We log 
Gross National Income per capita to reduce skewness. Most find that income is positively 
related to higher expenditures, arguing that wealth allows governments the greater luxury of 
stronger defense (Collier and Hoeffler 2004c). In economic terms, military spending is likely 
to be a normal good, that is a good with a positive income elasticity (Sandler and Hartley 
1995). High economic growth rates might make it easier for governments to impose a greater 
defense burden on society. We use total population (logged) to control for country size 
because this influences both ethnic heterogeneity and militarization (Population size). Collier 
and Hoeffler (2004b) report a negative effect of country size as measured by population on 
military budgets, arguing that large countries deter external threats. We control for regime 
type (Democracy) using the POLITY IV dataset’s polity2 indicator, which uses a weighting 
scheme to treat periods of transition (www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/). We expect 
autocracies to have higher military spending than democracies (Collier and Hoeffler 2002; 
Goldsmith 2003). Many have argued that autocracies are dependent on military force to 
sustain their rule, whereas democracies command a greater degree of legitimacy and are less 
in need of a strong military (Kimenyi and Mbaku 1995; Maizels and Nissanke 1986). We 
additionally control for overall government spending per GDP (Government expenditures), 
since high government consumption generally will have the same causes as high military 
spending. 
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Next, we control for internal and external security threats, which should impact 
militarization (Collier and Hoeffler 2004c). We enter a term for Civil war, which is a dummy 
variable for years in which a country experiences armed conflict with over 25 battle-related 
deaths (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Following Goldsmith (2003), the international war variable is a 
dummy for years in which a country engages in conflict between states with at least 1000 
deaths (International war). These data are taken from (Gleditsch et al. 2002). We also 
compute a count of civil and international peace years (Peace years (civil war) and Peace 
years (int. war)), or the simple count of the number of years since the last civil and 
international war since 1946 (Collier and Hoeffler 2004c). It is well established that, for civil 
wars at least, there is a high risk of revival, which suggests that militarization after the end of 
civil war is likely to diminish only slowly over time (Collier and Hoeffler 2004b). Civil wars 
could also be endogenous to militarization. High military expenditures can deter international 
conflicts, but can also provoke them due to fears among neighbors (Fordham and Walker 
2005). High military expenditures can signal to rebels that the initiation of a civil war is 
likely to end in defeat, but particularly in fragile post-conflict societies high expenditures can 
also increase the risk of renewed conflict if the former rebels take such expenditures as a 
signal of the bad faith of a government (Collier and Hoeffler 2004c). For these reasons, we 
run tests with and without the civil war variables (incidence and peace years) included. 
Similar to Collier and Hoeffler (2004b) we take a weighted average level of 
militarization of countries that are “contiguous” (Neighborhood militarization). The weight is 
GDP and contiguity is defined as either land contiguity or water contiguity up to 400 miles of 
water. Data are from the Correlates of War (COW) project and were taken from Bennett and 
Stam (Bennet and Stam 2003). In a context of rivalry, the level of militarization of 
contiguous countries can capture local arms race phenomena. In a context of non-rivalry, it 
can capture emulation, imitation and coordination effects. The contiguous militarization 
variable is not without problems, however. In effect, it introduces a spatial lag into the model 
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(Anselin 1998) and often captures variables omitted from the model (Simmons and Elkins 
2004). We believe our model is relatively comprehensive, but it would be difficult to say with 
confidence that there are no omitted variables. For this reason, we run tests with and without 
the contiguous militarization variables. 
Contrary to Collier and Hoeffler (2004b), we do not include a measure of predicted 
civil war. Such a variable creates all kinds of statistical problems. Instead, we control for the 
risk of civil war directly by our range of explanatory variables, which will capture the risk of 
civil war under the assumption that the factors triggering such war are time-persistent. 
Finally, we include year-specific dummies to capture any trends over time and year-specific 
international tension that influence defense spending globally, such as the end of the Cold 
War, the Persian Gulf War, and NATO action in the Balkans. Table 2 provides descriptive 
statistics of the variables. 
The estimation of TSCS data presents some special problems, particularly because of 
complex correlation patterns between and across panels (Beck and Katz 1995a, 1995b). Since 
our data is unbalanced to an extent that no time periods are common to all countries in the 
sample, the standard version of the Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) method of Beck 
and Katz cannot be used. As an alternative, we use a random-effects estimator with robust 
standard errors, assuming that observations are independent across countries, but not 
necessarily within countries over time, i.e. observations are clustered by units. The robust-
cluster option produces consistent standard errors even in the presence of serial correlation 
and heteroskedasticity, but it is potentially inefficient in estimation (Wiggins 1999). To 
ensure that results are not specific to our estimation technique, we additionally use the 
Generalized Estimation Equation method (GEE) (Zorn 2001), also under the assumption of 
clustered observations.  
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Results 
Table 3 presents the results for militarization with Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) measures of 
ethnic and religious heterogeneity. Note that year-specific time dummies are included in the 
estimations, but their coefficients are not reported. Column 1 reports results with random-
effects (cluster option) and column 2 reports results using the GEE method.7 As seen there, 
ethnic heterogeneity is negatively related to militarization across all three measures of 
militarization. Religious heterogeneity is not statistically significantly different from zero in 
any of the estimations. Substantively, holding all other variables at their mean values, raising 
ethnic heterogeneity by one standard deviation would reduce the share of military 
expenditures in GDP by almost three-quarter’s of a percent (0.71), which is quite large given 
that the global average military burden is only 2.9% of GDP. 
What about our control variables? Contrary to Goldsmith (2003) who tests a longer 
time period, we do not find that higher per capita income predicts higher defense spending, 
but a higher economic growth rate allows countries to engage in higher military spending. 
This difference in results might suggest some influence from the Cold War period that 
dominates other tests. Developed and Eastern European countries have on average reduced 
their military spending after the end of the Cold War, whereas developing countries have not, 
or if they have, by smaller degrees. Democracy has a negative and statistically significant 
impact on military spending, supporting Goldsmith’s (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler’s 
(2004b) findings. Democratic governments are able, independently of the level of 
fractionalization, wealth, and other controls, to focus a larger share of resources to other 
priorities than security. This result is not likely to be driven mainly by the fact that 
democracies thrive in peaceful neighborhoods and autocrats thrive in violent ones, which can 
                                                 
7
 Collinearity among the variables does not seem to be a problem. The average Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
score is around 2 in column 1. 
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be deduced from the fact that we control for violent conflict.8 Larger government 
consumption is also positively related to higher military expenditure. Military spending by 
contiguous countries and the incidence of civil war show the expected positive sign and are 
statistically significant, results that are also consistent with other studies (Goldsmith 2003; 
Gupta et al. 2001). Military expenditures decrease with a longer history of civil peace. 
Perhaps surprisingly, neither the incidence nor the history of international conflict seems to 
matter for military spending. 
With respect to military personnel as a share of the labor force, neither per capita 
income nor the economic growth rate has a statistically significant impact. Democracy shows 
a statistically significant negative effect on the share of labor devoted to security. Not 
surprisingly, population size is negatively related to military personnel as a share of the labor 
force, since countries with a large population need to allocate a smaller share of the labor 
force to military duties, but still retaining a large military in absolute numbers. Higher 
militarization by contiguous neighbors leads to higher militarization within the country. A 
longer history of civil peace leads to lower military personnel, whereas the opposite is true 
for the incidence of international war. This result is reasonable, as it is the rich countries that 
largely fight international wars (as in Kosovo and the Persian Gulf) and simultaneously 
maintain more capital intensive defense postures. 
Finally, regarding arms imports as a share of total imports, we find that higher arms 
imports by contiguous neighbors as well as the incidence and history of civil and 
international war have the predicted effect on a country’s arms imports. Democracies import 
fewer arms than autocracies, but the effect is marginally insignificant in random-effects 
estimation. Surprisingly, arms imports are lower in countries with a higher per capita income. 
                                                 
8
 There is a large literature on the democratic peace (Russett and Oneal 2001) and questions relating to spatial 
effects of neighborhoods and democracy (Gleditsch and Ward 2004; O'Loughlin et al. 1998). 
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An explanation could be that richer countries are able to produce a larger share of their 
armaments domestically. Government expenditure is positively associated with arms imports, 
whereas population size and the economic growth rate do not matter. 
In tables 4 to 6, we repeat the tests conducted above, but this time using alternative 
measures of heterogeneity. Estimations using Montalvo and Reynal-Querol’s (2005) 
measures of ethnic and religious fractionalization are reported in table 4. They mirror the 
results using Fearon’s (2003) and Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) measures: More ethnically 
fractionalized societies have lower military spending and lower arms imports, whereas 
religious fractionalization does not matter. The substantive effect of a standard deviation 
increase in fractionalization reduces the defense burden by almost one-half of a percent. The 
main difference to results in table 3 is that ethnic fractionalization, while being negatively 
signed, has no statistically significant effect on military personnel as a share of the labor 
force. Results from the main estimations reported in table 3 uphold if Roeder’s (2001) 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization index is used instead, with results reported in table 5. Alesina 
et al.’s (2003) measures of ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization are tested in table 
6. As seen there, it is linguistic fractionalization that has the strongest negative and 
statistically significant effect on military expenditures and arms imports, although it is not 
statistically significant for military personnel. Religious fractionalization exerts a negative 
and statistically significant impact on military personnel, however. Ethnic fractionalization 
remains insignificant across the dimensions. We re-ran all tests by dropping linguistic 
fractionalization because it is highly correlated with ethnic fractionalization, but the results 
do not change much. This result is plausible because it is Alesina et al.’s (2003) linguistic 
rather than ethnic fractionalization which is most highly correlated with Fearon and Laitin’s 
ethnic fractionalization measure (r = 0.88 as opposed to r = 0.76).  
Linguistic issues are potentially most explosive because questions concerning national 
language and school curricula determine the economic chances of people (Horowitz 2000), 
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but the fact that states do not militarize under linguistic diversity suggests that the consensus 
necessary for such spending is difficult under these conditions. To test whether the linguistic 
difference between the two largest groups matter, we now test Fearon’s (2003) measure of 
cultural fractionalization that adjusts his measure of ethnic fractionalization for the cultural 
distance between the ethnic groups using linguistic classifications of distance between major 
language families. For example, if ethnic groups belong to two distinct language families, 
such as Greek and Turkish, then the cultural distance is greater compared to two groups 
speaking Slavic East branch and Slavic West branch. Indeed, Fearon (2003: 215) argues that 
“if a researcher’s theory is that ethnic fractionalization matters because it makes for diverse 
preferences and consequent difficulties cooperating, then the measure of cultural 
fractionalization (...) may be more appropriate.” Alesina et al (2003) concur. Table 7 repeats 
the estimations from table 3, but replacing ethnic with cultural fractionalization (Cultural 
fraction). This variable is negatively signed, but only statistically significant for military 
personnel, and then only in GEE estimation. It is only marginally insignificant in columns 1 
to 3, however. These results, too, however, do not suggest that cultural distance based on 
language similarity matters for predicting the degree of state militarization. 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
We ran our models with several alternative conceptualizations of ethnicity followed by a 
number of robustness checks on our basic results.9 We test ethnic and religious polarization 
and a measure of ethnic exclusion from state power. First, we replaced the fractionalization 
with Montalvo and Reynal-Querol’s (2005) polarization measures. Neither ethnic nor 
religious polarization has any impact on militarization, regardless of the dependent variable 
used. These results do not support the proposition that it is polarization rather than 
                                                 
9
 These results will be made available as a web appendix upon publication. 
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fractionalization that really matters for predicting militarization. Next, we entered Cederman 
and Girardin’s (2007) measure of ethnic exclusion (N-star). If ethnic groups excluded from 
state power are most likely to rebel as Cederman and Girardin (2007) argue, then do ethnic 
minority governments respond to this threat via increased militarization? The coefficients of 
this variable switched between positive and negative in the models tested, but none of them at 
any time came close to being statistically significant. We thus find no association between 
ethnic exclusion from state power and militarization. Others have shown that this measure is 
not a robust predictor of civil war either (Fearon et al. 2007). However, it is too early to come 
to a definite conclusion on this measure as the N-star variable is currently only available for 
Eurasia and North Africa and does not yet account for changes in the ethnic composition of 
state power over time. We intend to revisit this important question when an updated measure 
that is spatially and temporally more comprehensive.10 
We dropped the contiguous militarization and conflict variables to assess the effects 
of ethnic heterogeneity without them in the model, since these variables might suffer from 
endogeneity bias. When these variables are dropped, the basic results on most of the 
heterogeneity variables change little, but the heterogeneity variables from Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol (2003) and the linguistic fractionalization variable from Alesina et al. (2003) 
become statistically insignificant, while maintaining their negative coefficient sign. The 
government expenditure variable suffers from partial identity bias since current military 
expenditures form part of general government expenditure. Unfortunately, current military 
expenditures cannot be netted out from general government expenditure since the available 
military expenditure data include both capital formation and current expenditures for military 
purposes. If we drop government expenditures from the model, then our results are hardly 
affected. To see whether ethnic and religious heterogeneity exerts a non-linear influence on 
                                                 
10
 Cederman and Girardin are currently working on such an update (personal communication). 
 19 
military spending, we repeated the estimations with squared and, in separate estimations, 
even cubic heterogeneity terms included. However, we found no evidence for non-linear 
relationships.  
We followed Goldsmith (2003) and controlled for the previous year’s value of the 
dependent variable. One can argue that military budget decisions are subject to bureaucratic 
inertia (Goldsmith 2003; Gupta et al. 2001). Results on our main variables of interest are little 
affected in terms of the sign of the coefficient and statistical significance when entering a 
lagged dependent variable. We tried to capture some crude cross-regional heterogeneity by 
employing regional dummies. We use the regional classification provided in the World 
Development Indicators CD-rom version (World Bank 2004). With the exception of North 
Africa and Middle East, which often showed a higher level of militarization, there was little 
evidence for systematic regional differences. Our main results were hardly affected with the 
exception of the heterogeneity variables derived from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2003) 
and Alesina et al. (2003), which sometimes became (marginally) insignificant, while 
maintaining their negative coefficient sign.  
Next, we added further control variables. Contrary to others, the share of the 
population urbanized had little effect on the results (Davoodi et al. 2001). The same is true 
for the level of aid to gross national income, which might ease the budget constraint. One 
might wonder whether oil wealth might allow governments to achieve greater levels of 
militarization. Adding a dummy variable taking the value of one if oil exports reach one third 
of total GDP (Fearon and Laitin 2003), suggests no impact on military expenditures or 
military personnel, but oil has a positive and statistically significant effect on arms imports. 
This result is reasonable because major oil exporters, such as the Persian Gulf countries, have 
been major arms importers during the study period. The results on the remaining variables 
were hardly affected, however. The same is true if we add a dummy variable for the 20 
largest arms-producing countries based on information from SIPRI to the arms imports 
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regressions (SIPRI 2002). Major arms producers import fewer arms, as expected. Our main 
results remain valid. Finally, we limited our analyses to a sub-sample of only developing 
countries. The results on diversity remain very similar. In sum, there is no indication from 
any of the tests that fractionalization increases militarization. The same is true for 
polarization. 
 
Conclusions 
Several disciplines use ethnic diversity as an explanation for societal outcomes, ranging from 
democratization and governance to violent political conflict and economic performance. 
Recent empirical studies show that ethnic diversity hampers public goods provision because 
consensus and coordination are difficult under conditions of competing preferences. In 
addition, explanations of violent conflict see ethnic diversity as problematic because it can 
lead to mutual hatred stemming from historic legacies and the fear of domination by cultural 
others. Recent cross-national quantitative studies show, however, that ethnic diversity makes 
countries safer. The question our study was concerned with is: do states in ethnically diverse 
societies engage in preventive militarization? If they did, then this could both provide a 
mechanism through which diverse societies achieve civil peace and an explanation for why 
diversity leads to under-provision of such public goods as education and infrastructure 
(crowding out). 
Our results simply do not support this view. Militarization is actually lower under 
conditions of greater diversity measured by several different indicators. Ethno-linguistic 
diversity in particular seems to be what matters rather than polarization. If in fact, as some 
find, ethnicized armed violence is most likely when two groups are of similar size, then it is 
not likely that militarization is the link as to why heterogeneous societies are better able to 
maintain peace. In fact, empirical studies that have tested the direct effect of ethnic and other 
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diversity on state repression have found ethnicity to have no effect, or even to lower 
repression (de Soysa 2007; Lee et al. 2004; Walker and Poe 2002). 
If preventive militarisation cannot explain why ethnically diverse societies are 
surprisingly peaceful, what can? Fearon and Laitin (1996) developed theories of interethnic 
cooperation built on in-group policing and fear of spirals of conflict. Our estimations of 
government behavior in the security sector under conditions of diversity support those views 
that suggest ways in which diversity may in fact promote peaceful conflict resolution (Collier 
2001; Fearon and Laitin 1996; Gagnon 2004; Varshney 2001). Most importantly, our results 
suggest that if greater diversity is in fact a constraint on organizing violence, then this is not a 
result of higher state militarization. These results support those who advocate promoting 
democracy and diversity, not secession, as the antidote to the so-called development tragedy 
in Africa (Collier 2001).  
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Table 1. Correlation matrix of fractionalization and polarization measures. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 9 10 
1: Ethnic fraction (Fearon & Laitin) 1.00          
2: Religious fraction (Fearon & Laitin) 0.39 1.00         
3: Cultural fraction (Fearon) 0.82 0.33 1.00        
4: Ethnic fraction (Alesina et al.) 0.76 0.31 0.74 1.00       
5: Religious fraction (Alesina et al.) 0.31 0.89 0.20 0.23 1.00      
6: Linguistic fraction (Alesina et al.) 0.88 0.40 0.74 0.68 0.31 1.00     
7: Ethnolinguistic fraction (Roeder) 0.85 0.43 0.70 0.83 0.36 0.76 1.00    
8: Ethnic fraction (Montalvo & R-Q) 0.84 0.36 0.68 0.81 0.29 0.73 0.86 1.00   
9: Religious fraction (Montalvo & R-Q) 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.51 0.48 0.52 0.54 1.00  
10: Ethnic polarization (Montalvo & R-Q) 0.42 0.12 0.39 0.55 0.11 0.28 0.51 0.58 0.32 1.00 
11: Religious polarization (Montalvo & R-Q) 0.54 0.46 0.51 0.59 0.47 0.50 0.58 0.57 0.96 0.40 
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Table 2. Summary statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Military expenditures per GDP 1589 2.90 2.82 0 29.00 
Military personnel per labor force 1393 1.39 1.72 0 23.68 
Arms imports to total imports 1406 2.85 5.32 0 36.86 
Ethfrac (Fearon & Laitin) 1587 0.40 0.27 0 0.93 
Relfrac (Fearon & Laitin) 1587 0.36 0.21 0 0.78 
Cultfrac (Fearon) 1561 0.30 0.20 0 0.73 
Ethfrac (Alesina et al.) 1589 0.44 0.25 0 0.93 
Relfrac (Alesina et al.) 1589 0.42 0.23 0 0.86 
Linfrac (Alesina et al.) 1560 0.39 0.28 0 0.92 
Ethlinfrac (Roeder) 1589 0.46 0.27 0 0.98 
Ethfrac (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol) 1307 0.44 0.28 0.01 0.96 
Relfrac (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol) 1321 0.28 0.23 0.00 0.78 
Ethpol (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol) 1307 0.51 0.24 0.02 0.98 
Relpol (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol) 1321 0.46 0.34 0 1.00 
Gross National Income p.c. (ln) 1589 8.34 1.15 5.94 10.49 
Economic growth p. c. 1589 0.04 0.06 -0.51 0.33 
Democracy (Polity IV) 1589 2.92 6.97 -10.00 10.00 
Government expenditures 1589 16.24 6.64 2.98 56.51 
Population size (ln) 1589 16.30 1.46 12.87 20.97 
Neighborhood military expenditures 1589 2.97 2.28 0 24.46 
Neighborhood military personnnel 1393 1.21 1.14 0 9.43 
Neighborhood arms imports 1406 2.85 5.32 0 36.86 
Peace years (civil war) 1589 20.14 18.95 0 56.00 
Peace years (international conflict) 1589 26.77 17.31 0.00 56.00 
Civil war 1589 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
International war 1589 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
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Table 3. Militarization and Fearon and Laitin’s measures of fractionalization, 1988–2002 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 XTREG XTGEE XTREG XTGEE XTREG XTGEE 
 Mil.Expenditure. Mil.Expenditure Mil.Personnel Mil.Personnel Arms Imports Arms Imports 
Ethnic.fraction (Fearon & Laitin) -2.523*** -2.545*** -0.903** -0.940** -3.307** -3.311** 
 (4.15) (4.15) (2.46) (2.46) (2.41) (2.46) 
Religious. fraction (Fearon & Laitin) 0.877 0.880 -0.541 -0.559 0.611 0.647 
 (1.20) (1.21) (1.31) (1.34) (0.40) (0.43) 
Gross National Income per capita (ln) -0.328 -0.338 0.050 0.035 -0.690* -0.647* 
 (1.39) (1.43) (0.46) (0.31) (1.93) (1.86) 
Economic growth per capita 1.293** 1.281** 0.093 0.064 -0.208 -0.097 
 (2.08) (2.09) (0.14) (0.10) (0.08) (0.04) 
Democracy (Polity IV) -0.040** -0.039** -0.012* -0.012* -0.105 -0.112* 
 (2.28) (2.25) (1.89) (1.79) (1.62) (1.72) 
Government expenditures 0.158*** 0.157*** 0.028** 0.028** 0.161** 0.164*** 
 (4.52) (4.56) (2.17) (2.15) (2.52) (2.69) 
Population Size (ln) -0.034 -0.044 -0.150** -0.164** 0.375 0.390 
 (0.30) (0.38) (2.35) (2.30) (1.49) (1.57) 
Neighborhood militarization 0.130** 0.126** 0.568** 0.557** 0.110 0.118* 
 (2.52) (2.48) (2.23) (2.17) (1.55) (1.72) 
Peace years (civil war) -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.004* -0.004** -0.024* -0.024* 
 (3.74) (3.74) (1.81) (2.02) (1.84) (1.89) 
Peace years (intern. conflict) 0.006 0.007 -0.009 -0.009 -0.035** -0.031** 
 (0.72) (0.74) (1.56) (1.53) (2.30) (2.20) 
Civil war 0.639*** 0.639*** 0.055 0.053 2.375** 2.391*** 
 (3.24) (3.26) (0.77) (0.76) (2.55) (2.60) 
International war 0.763 0.761 0.608* 0.612* 3.232** 3.160** 
 (1.24) (1.25) (1.79) (1.80) (2.19) (2.18) 
Observations 1587 1587 1383 1383 1396 1396 
Countries 131 131 138 138 139 139 
 
Notes: Absolute values of t- and z-statistics in brackets. Constant and year-specific time-dummies included, but coefficients not reported. 
*, **, *** significant at .1, .05 and .01 level, respectively. 
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Table 4. Militarization and Montalvo and Reynal-Queirol’s measures of fractionalization, 1988–2002 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 XTREG XTGEE XTREG XTGEE XTREG XTGEE 
 Mil.Expenditure. Mil.Expenditure Mil.Personnel Mil.Personnel Arms Imports Arms Imports 
Ethnic fraction (Montalvo & R-Q.) -1.580** -1.688** -0.771 -0.777 -2.985* -2.979* 
 (2.02) (2.03) (1.22) (1.21) (1.68) (1.68) 
Religious fraction (Montalvo & R-Q.) 1.173 1.002 0.786 0.769 0.670 0.684 
 (1.40) (1.11) (1.37) (1.35) (0.37) (0.38) 
Gross National Income per capita (ln) 0.062 -0.026 0.218* 0.213* -0.406 -0.407 
 (0.25) (0.08) (1.76) (1.69) (1.09) (1.10) 
Economic growth per capita 0.848 0.855 -0.967 -0.968 -4.458 -4.354 
 (1.21) (1.22) (0.86) (0.87) (1.14) (1.12) 
Democracy (Polity IV) -0.036** -0.032* -0.005 -0.005 -0.160** -0.160** 
 (1.98) (1.80) (0.76) (0.74) (2.09) (2.12) 
Government expenditures 0.135*** 0.128*** 0.016** 0.016** 0.208*** 0.205*** 
 (5.01) (4.84) (2.01) (2.00) (2.60) (2.58) 
Population size (ln) -0.121 -0.204 -0.223** -0.231** 0.370 0.361 
 (0.84) (1.21) (2.49) (2.49) (1.31) (1.28) 
Neighborhood militarization 0.104** 0.090* 0.579** 0.574** 0.115 0.113 
 (1.99) (1.80) (2.13) (2.12) (1.37) (1.35) 
Peace years (civil war) -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.039** -0.039*** 
 (4.07) (3.95) (2.94) (2.97) (2.56) (2.60) 
Peace years (intern. conflict) 0.010 0.011 -0.007 -0.007 -0.036** -0.036** 
 (1.19) (1.36) (1.23) (1.21) (2.33) (2.36) 
Civil war 0.598*** 0.603*** 0.068 0.068 2.185** 2.191** 
 (2.92) (2.96) (0.93) (0.94) (2.16) (2.18) 
International war 0.254 0.233 0.300* 0.298* 1.886** 1.903** 
 (0.87) (0.81) (1.76) (1.76) (2.16) (2.21) 
Observations 1307 1307 1161 1161 1164 1164 
Countries 102 102 109 109 109 109 
 
Notes: Absolute values of t- and z-statistics in brackets. Constant and year-specific time-dummies included, but coefficients not reported. 
*, **, *** significant at .1, .05 and .01 level, respectively. 
Table 5. Militarization and Roeder’s measure of fractionalization, 1988–2002 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 XTREG XTGEE XTREG XTGEE XTREG XTGEE 
 Mil.Expenditure. Mil.Expenditure Mil.Personnel Mil.Personnel Arms Imports Arms Imports 
Ethnolinguistic fraction (Roeder) -1.612** -1.634** -0.940** -0.978** -2.300* -2.306* 
 (2.20) (2.21) (2.05) (2.05) (1.71) (1.78) 
Gross National Income per capita (ln) -0.241 -0.252 0.086 0.074 -0.541 -0.509 
 (0.98) (1.02) (0.87) (0.72) (1.35) (1.28) 
Economic growth per capita  1.282** 1.271** 0.137 0.112 -0.457 -0.379 
 (2.07) (2.07) (0.22) (0.18) (0.19) (0.16) 
Democracy (Polity IV) -0.038** -0.037** -0.012* -0.011* -0.097 -0.102 
 (2.18) (2.16) (1.83) (1.74) (1.51) (1.58) 
Government expenditures 0.158*** 0.157*** 0.025** 0.025** 0.150** 0.153*** 
 (4.51) (4.55) (2.06) (2.03) (2.46) (2.61) 
Population size (ln) -0.024 -0.033 -0.140** -0.154** 0.367 0.383 
 (0.21) (0.29) (2.18) (2.13) (1.52) (1.61) 
Contiguous militarization 0.130** 0.126** 0.574** 0.562** 0.120 0.129* 
 (2.54) (2.50) (2.22) (2.15) (1.63) (1.81) 
Peace years (civil war) -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.004* -0.004** -0.022* -0.022* 
 (3.60) (3.60) (1.75) (2.00) (1.72) (1.74) 
Peace years (intern. conflict) 0.007 0.007 -0.009 -0.009 -0.034** -0.030** 
 (0.74) (0.75) (1.50) (1.48) (2.26) (2.17) 
Civil war 0.642*** 0.642*** 0.062 0.060 2.389** 2.403*** 
 (3.24) (3.27) (0.88) (0.87) (2.57) (2.62) 
International war 0.753 0.753 0.607* 0.612* 3.249** 3.176** 
 (1.23) (1.24) (1.76) (1.77) (2.17) (2.16) 
Observations 1589 1589 1393 1393 1406 1406 
Countries 132 132 139 139 140 140 
 
Notes: Absolute values of t- and z-statistics in brackets. Constant and year-specific time-dummies included, but coefficients not reported. 
*, **, *** significant at .1, .05 and .01 level, respectively. 
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Table 6. Militarization and Alesina et al.’s measures of fractionalization, 1988–2002 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 XTREG XTGEE XTREG XTGEE XTREG XTGEE 
 Mil.Expenditure. Mil.Expenditure Mil.Personnel Mil.Personnel Arms Imports Arms Imports 
Ethnic fraction (Alesina et al.) 0.517 0.486 0.901 0.867 1.590 1.470 
 (0.51) (0.48) (1.12) (1.06) (1.01) (0.95) 
Religious fraction (Alesina et al.) -0.321 -0.314 -0.794* -0.801* -0.498 -0.428 
 (0.47) (0.46) (1.88) (1.89) (0.34) (0.30) 
Linguistic fraction (Alesina et al.) -1.464* -1.473* -0.943 -0.961 -2.688* -2.698** 
 (1.77) (1.78) (1.53) (1.57) (1.96) (1.99) 
Gross National Income per capita (ln) -0.187 -0.203 0.155 0.140 -0.437 -0.414 
 (0.73) (0.78) (1.40) (1.24) (1.13) (1.11) 
Economic growth per capita 1.197* 1.182* 0.028 0.006 0.330 0.414 
 (1.83) (1.83) (0.04) (0.01) (0.14) (0.18) 
Democracy (Polity IV) -0.037** -0.037** -0.012* -0.011* -0.108 -0.115* 
 (2.15) (2.11) (1.77) (1.69) (1.63) (1.72) 
Government expenditures 0.159*** 0.158*** 0.025** 0.025** 0.154** 0.157*** 
 (4.50) (4.54) (2.11) (2.08) (2.49) (2.65) 
Population size (ln) -0.022 -0.033 -0.129** -0.141** 0.393 0.405* 
 (0.19) (0.28) (2.08) (2.05) (1.63) (1.70) 
Neighborhood militarization 0.129** 0.124** 0.569** 0.558** 0.114 0.123* 
 (2.49) (2.44) (2.24) (2.17) (1.51) (1.69) 
Peace years (civil war) -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.003 -0.004* -0.016 -0.016 
 (3.33) (3.32) (1.51) (1.71) (1.16) (1.21) 
Peace years (intern. conflict) 0.006 0.006 -0.009 -0.009 -0.039** -0.035** 
 (0.64) (0.67) (1.51) (1.49) (2.47) (2.40) 
Civil war 0.629*** 0.629*** 0.034 0.032 2.482** 2.501** 
 (2.95) (2.98) (0.51) (0.49) (2.44) (2.49) 
International war 0.797 0.794 0.629* 0.632* 3.284** 3.208** 
 (1.30) (1.30) (1.81) (1.82) (2.17) (2.16) 
Observations 1560 1560 1360 1360 1373 1373 
Countries 130 130 136 136 137 137 
 
Notes: Absolute values of t- and z-statistics in brackets. Constant and year-specific time-dummies included, but coefficients not reported. 
*, **, *** significant at .1, .05 and .01 level, respectively. 
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Table 7. Militarization and Fearon and Laitin’s measures of ethnic fractionalization adjusted for cultural/linguistic distance. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 XTREG XTGEE XTREG XTGEE XTREG XTGEE 
 Mil.Expenditure. Mil.Expenditure Mil.Personnel Mil.Personnel Arms Imports Arms Imports 
Cultural fraction (Fearon) -1.447 -1.488 -0.906 -0.939* -1.703 -1.731 
 (1.54) (1.55) (1.62) (1.68) (0.95) (1.00) 
Religious fraction (Fearon & Laitin) 0.473 0.469 -0.620 -0.651* 0.012 0.046 
 (0.61) (0.60) (1.62) (1.70) (0.01) (0.02) 
Gross National Income per capita (ln) -0.169 -0.196 0.081 0.062 -0.432 -0.393 
 (0.67) (0.77) (0.70) (0.54) (1.10) (1.00) 
Economic growth per capita 1.394** 1.369** 0.097 0.066 -0.311 -0.211 
 (2.24) (2.22) (0.15) (0.10) (0.12) (0.08) 
Democracy (Polity IV) -0.037** -0.036** -0.012* -0.011* -0.098 -0.104* 
 (2.16) (2.08) (1.81) (1.70) (1.55) (1.65) 
Government expenditures 0.160*** 0.158*** 0.029** 0.029** 0.160** 0.162*** 
 (4.52) (4.56) (2.24) (2.22) (2.44) (2.61) 
Population size (ln) -0.064 -0.086 -0.166*** -0.185** 0.323 0.338 
 (0.54) (0.70) (2.62) (2.55) (1.35) (1.44) 
Neighborhood militarization 0.131** 0.122** 0.579** 0.565** 0.117 0.126* 
 (2.55) (2.44) (2.29) (2.21) (1.56) (1.73) 
Peace years (civil war) -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.004 -0.004* -0.021 -0.020 
 (3.51) (3.48) (1.55) (1.77) (1.55) (1.58) 
Peace years (intern. confl.) 0.006 0.006 -0.011* -0.011* -0.035** -0.031** 
 (0.65) (0.68) (1.82) (1.79) (2.21) (2.12) 
Civil war 0.676*** 0.675*** 0.066 0.064 2.472** 2.487*** 
 (3.35) (3.37) (0.90) (0.89) (2.55) (2.59) 
International war 0.778 0.776 0.623* 0.630* 3.299** 3.234** 
 (1.24) (1.25) (1.80) (1.81) (2.17) (2.16) 
Observations 1561 1561 1362 1362 1374 1374 
Countries 129 129 136 136 137 137 
 
Notes: Absolute t-statistics in brackets. Constant and year-specific time-dummies included, but coefficients not reported. *, **, *** significant at 
.1, .05 and .01 level, respectively. 
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